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Abstract
Models of cognitive processes often include simplifications,
idealisations, and fictionalisations, so how should we learn
about cognitive processes from such models? Particularly in
cognitive science, when many features of the target system are
unknown, it is not always clear which simplifications, ideal-
isations, and so on, are appropriate for a research question,
and which are highly misleading. Here we use a case-study
from studies of language evolution, and ideas from philoso-
phy of science, to illustrate a robustness approach to learning
from models. Robust properties are those that arise across a
range of models, simulations and experiments, and can be used
to identify key causal structures in the models, and the phe-
nomenon, under investigation. For example, in studies of lan-
guage evolution, the emergence of compositional structure is a
robust property across models, simulations and experiments of
cultural transmission, but only under pressures for learnability
and expressivity. This arguably illustrates the principles under-
lying real cases of language evolution. We provide an outline
of the robustness approach, including its limitations, and sug-
gest that this methodology can be productively used through-
out cognitive science. Perhaps of most importance, it suggests
that different modelling frameworks should be used as tools
to identify the abstract properties of a system, rather than be-
ing definitive expressions of theories. Keywords: Language
Evolution; Cultural Evolution; Robustness
Introduction
A central question in the field of the evolution of language
is whether linguistic structure is mainly a product of domain-
specific genetic constraints, or of cultural transmission. How-
ever, the cultural evolution of language is difficult to study
because there is little direct evidence available. Simulations1
make it possible to study of the dynamics of cultural evo-
lution, but often include highly simplified mechanisms of
learning. Human experiments obviously use a realistic learn-
ing mechanism, but present the problem that test subjects al-
ready know natural languages, and it is difficult to control for
individual differences in learning. While recent work sug-
gests that compositional linguistic structure emerges in iter-
1In this paper we maintain a distinction between ‘models’, which
are analytically analysable descriptions of a system and ‘simula-
tions’ which are individual numerical implementations of a model.
While some results are derived analytically from models, others
come from numerical simulation. Iterated learning experiments with
human subjects can also be seen as simulations of the process of lan-
guage evolution.
ated learning contexts under pressures to be learnable and ex-
pressive (Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008), problems with sim-
ulations and human experiments potentially make it difficult
to justify theoretical claims about the evolution of language.
We explore how the notion of ‘robustness’ from philoso-
phy of science (e.g. Wimsatt, 1981; Weisberg & Reisman,
2008) can be used to support claims in language evolution;
specifically, we argue that emergent compositional structure
is a robust property of iterated learning. We suggest how to
extend this methodology to similar claims across cognitive
science, that are based on unrealistic models, and little direct
empirical evidence.
Language Evolution
Before discussing the notion of robustness, it is first necessary
to introduce work on the iterated learning model (ILM) in lan-
guage evolution as this will be used as a case-study. The ILM
looks at how culturally transmitted systems (e.g. a mapping
between linguistic signals and meanings) change by being re-
peatedly transmitted through a bottleneck (Kirby, 2000). The
bottleneck is a restriction of information that could be due to a
finite limit on the information to be transferred or a restricted
set of meanings to be described. The bottleneck causes the
system to change over time, usually towards a more com-
pressible relationship between signals and meanings. This
can be interpreted as a pressure on the language to become
more ‘learnable’ by the next generation. In the extreme case,
the variation in the system reduces so that there is only one
signal. Opposing this is a pressure for expressivity (e.g. a
need to distinguish between meanings). A perfectly expres-
sive linguistic system has a different signal for each meaning.
Smith, Kirby, and Brighton (2003) showed that an optimal
solution under these two pressures is compositionality: the
meaning of a signal is composed of sub-meanings expressed
by sub-strings of the signal. This means that there are fewer
signal components to be learned than individual meanings,
and the signals of unobserved meanings can be re-constructed
accurately. The demonstration that cultural transmission can
lead to complex linguistic structure contrasts with theories
that see linguistic structure as primarily deriving from in-
nate, domain-specific constraints (Chomsky, 1965, see Kirby,
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Dowman, & Griffiths, 2007).
The initial work on the iterated learning model involved
computational simulations. Instead of committing to a par-
ticular model or simulation framework, a range of compu-
tational techniques were used as tools to demonstrate the
principles of the iterated learning model. These include
grammar induction models (Kirby, 2000), exemplar models
(Batali, 2002), neural network models (Kirby & Hurford,
2002; Swarup & Gasser, 2008) and self-organising maps
(Worgan & Damper, 2008).
The next step involved translating the ILM into a labora-
tory experiment. Kirby, Cornish, and Smith (2008) demon-
strated that the emergence of compositional structure could
be observed in an artificial language which was learned, pro-
duced, transmitted and then learned again by human subjects.
Participants were exposed to pairings of nonsense words and
meanings and asked to memorise them. The meanings were
images with structured semantic dimensions: shape (circle,
triangle, square), colour (red, blue, black) and movement
(horizontal, bouncing, or spiraling motion). Participants were
trained on a sub-set of the whole meaning space, but they
were then asked to produce a label for every meaning. The
labels that were produced became the training data for the
next participant. This meant that the language changed as it
was transmitted from participant to participant, mirroring the
cultural transmission of language.
By this process, the language adapted to two pressures. A
bottleneck on transmission was present, because the partici-
pants were not trained on all labels. This put a pressure on
the language to become more faithfully transmitted. With
only this pressure, the number of distinct labels in the lan-
guage declined. These languages were easy to learn, but
not expressive. To counter this, a pressure for expressivity
was added by excluding homonyms from the training sub-
set. Under both pressures, the language adapted to become
learnable and expressive by becoming compositional. That
is, instead of labels being distinct and holistic, sub-parts of
each label consistently referred to sub-parts of each mean-
ing. For instance, in one emergent language, all meanings
which included the colour blue began with an ‘L’ while all
meanings that included the spiralling movement ended with
‘PILU’ (see Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008, p. 10684). This
meant that the language was both easy to learn and could ex-
press all meanings distinctly.
The ILM experiment showed that compositional structure
could emerge spontaneously due to the process of cultural
transmission. The results mirrored those of the computa-
tional simulations, leading to the experiments being thought
of as simulations with human participants (see Kirby, Smith,
& Cornish, 2008).
The ILM sparked a lineage of experimental simulations
testing different constraints and assumptions of the original
simulation, including replacing the exclusion of homonyms
with a pressure for communication between two participants
(Matthews, Kirby, & Cornish, 2010; Silvey, Kirby, & Smith,
2012; Navarro & Perfors, 2011; Tamariz, Cornish, Roberts,
& Kirby, 2012; Verhoef & Boer, 2012). Bringing the pro-
cess full circle, principles elucidated through the human sim-
ulations motivated new computational simulations (Smith,
Tamariz, Cornish, & Kirby, 2013). There are differences be-
tween these studies, for example the precise distribution of
letters in the strings that emerge is not robust across compu-
tational and human simulations since human distinctions be-
tween vowels and consonants were not built into the compu-
tational agents. However, in each case the results were com-
patible with the theory of structure emerging though repeated
transmission through a bottleneck under pressures for learn-
ability and expressivity.
Problems with abstraction and transparency
Computational models have many advantages: the internal
states of individuals are transparent and quantifiable; the ex-
act amount of noise is quantifiable; and exploring the param-
eter space can be easier than running alternate conditions in
human experiments (e.g. Reali & Griffiths, 2010 model an
infinite population). However, the abstractions inherent in
computational models can be a weakness because a model’s
implications rely on the ability to translate between the ab-
stractions and the real world. Computational models of the
cultural evolution of language may simplify the represen-
tation of linguistic units, learning processes or psycholog-
ical mechanisms. Simplifying assumptions might be made
such as agents sharing an innate, conceptual space for words
and meanings (Vogt, 2005) or being able to observe intended
meanings (Worgan & Damper, 2008).
In contrast, laboratory experiments with real humans in-
clude artificial languages with concrete analogues to real lan-
guages and real learning mechanisms. However, while the
learning mechanisms are realistic, they are opaque. It is dif-
ficult to deduce the precise mental processes that lead to the
emergence of structure. Because of this complexity, it is diffi-
cult to maintain absolute experimental control. Furthermore,
the participants already have full knowledge of a composi-
tional language. This is a potential confound since the emer-
gent structure may just be a reflection of the participants’ ex-
isting language rather than being caused by the same process
that proto-linguistic humans underwent (e.g. Flynn, 2008;
Chomsky, 2011). However, as we shall see below, these prob-
lems can be addressed by demonstrating that the outcome is
a robust property across different models..
Aims of models and simulations
One crucial question in this area of research is what simula-
tions are used to learn about, and thus what kind of theoretical
inferences can possibly be warranted from them. Simulations
of cultural transmission are not intended as instantiations of
human language learning, nor the evolution of a real lan-
guage. However, the ILM is informative about systems that
are transmitted through a bottleneck, and that become more
structured as a result. The simulations, then, are an example
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Figure 1: How simulations, models and lab experiments can
contribute to theories of language evolution. Potential prob-
lems in the translation from the target phenomenon to mod-
els, simulations, and experiments (dotted arrows) are spread
over many approaches, while the discovery of robust proper-
ties found across all these approaches provide support for the
central theory (thick arrows).
of cultural transmission’s effect on structure in cultural phe-
nomena, where human language is one of these more general
phenomena. Results from simulations of iterated learning can
therefore inform the general theory of iterated learning2.
In the field of language evolution, simulations of iterated
learning are used as thought experiments to show that nativist
assumptions are not necessary to account for the emergence
of complex linguistic structure. Computational simulations
can be more powerful than traditional thought experiments
because they must usually be instantiated at a more technical
level, and because they allow complex interactions and struc-
tures which might be unintuitive (Bedau, 1998).
Di Paolo, Noble, and Bullock (2000) suggest a workable
methodology for opaque thought experiments:
1) Exploratory phase: Explore model behaviour, observe
patterns
2) Experimental phase: Formulate hypotheses that organ-
ise patterns (‘explanatory organisation’). Some patterns will
be explained by the model dynamics directly. Some patterns
will be explained through other observed patterns (‘indirect
explanation’).
3) Explanatory phase: Relate organisation of observations
to the theories about natural phenomena, explain the conse-
quences.
2However, since the target of study is the cultural transmis-
sion process (how systems change by being repeatedly transmitted
through a bottleneck) both computational and human simulations
can arguably be seen as actual instantiations of this highly abstract
generic phenomenon.
This idea is very similar to recent work in philosophy of
science (particularly philosophy of economics), where mod-
els and simulations can be seen as ‘credible worlds’, con-
structed to explore general theoretical principles (Sugden,
2000, 2009). Recent work on model-based theorising
(Weisberg, 2007; Godfrey-Smith, 2006), largely based on ex-
amples from population biology, incorporates similar stages
of modelling, going through stages of model construction,
model analysis (stage 1 and 2) and the (optional) stage of
the exploration of how well the model ‘fits’ the target sys-
tem, and thus which general principles can be learned from
the model (stage 3). Here too, there are questions about how
these constructed, and often highly simplified worlds relate to
real world systems.
There are two main ways model-world fit can be evaluated,
both found in cognitive science. One is to consider the trans-
lation from the target system to the model/simulation, for ex-
ample when models and simulations are used as abstract ana-
logues of a concrete phenomenon (e.g. eye saccades during
reading). Here knowledge about the target system is used to
construct the model (though of course it may involve simpli-
fication, idealisation and so on). Model-world fit is analysed
by considering how different the model is from our knowl-
edge of the target system (perhaps it fails to capture important
structural or causal features).
The other way to consider model-world fit is to consider
the converse; the translation from a model/simulation back
to a the target system. Here, a model-simulation is con-
structed using relevant background knowledge of a family
of targets, but not intended to represent any particular target
system. Once the principles governing the model/simulation
are established, the researcher then looks to see if the
model/simulation actually captures any targets in the real
world. If any are found, then the researcher infers that the
same principles govern the model/simulation and these target
systems. It is this kind of translation that is found in Weis-
berg and Godfrey-Smith’s description of model-based sci-
ence, where justifications must be given for inferences from
properties found in a model to properties of a target system.
In language evolution, this inference goes from the results of
iterated learning paradigms to real cases of language evolu-
tion.
In order to support this inference, there are a number of
ways that model-target fit can be evaluated. The role that the
notion of robustness plays in these evaluations is discussed
below, and linked to other cases in cognitive science.
Model-Target Fit and Robustness
Robust properties
Robust properties are those that are consistently found across
a set of different models, suggesting that it is an ‘important’
property that derives not from incidental features of the model
(e.g. its particular assumptions and simplifications), but from
the core structure found across all the models (Levins, 1966;
Wimsatt, 1981; Weisberg, 2006; Weisberg & Reisman, 2008).
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As Levins originally put it, “if these models, despite their dif-
ferent assumptions, lead to similar results, we have what we
can call a robust theorem that is relatively free of the details
of the model. Hence, our truth is the intersection of indepen-
dent lies.” (Levins, 1966, p. 20). As detailed above, in the
case of language evolution the emergence of linguistic struc-
ture is a robust property of iterated learning systems under the
pressures of expressivity and learability.
However, Weisberg and Reisman (2008) identify several
(related) kinds of robustness: parameter, structural and rep-
resentational robustness. First, a model can be robust (i.e.
give roughly the same results) for a wide range of parame-
ter settings. Second, a set of crucial causal components that
make up the ‘core structure’ noted above give rise to struc-
tural robustness. Finally, representational robustness refers
to the range of model descriptions (e.g. programming lan-
guages or mathematical formalisms used) for which a model
still gives rise to the same results. Of most relevance in the
sections below are structural and representational robustness,
detailed below.
Multi-model method
One way that robustness analyses figure in language evolu-
tion research is through the use of different types of models.
Researchers in the field of cultural evolution see models as
tools, not necessarily as reflections of theories (e.g. Cornish,
Tamariz, & Kirby, 2009). As tools, they need not commit the
researcher to particular methodological approaches (agent-
based or mathematical) nor particular theories of cognition
(e.g. humans as Bayesian learners or frequentist learners).
Testing the same ideas across a range of mathematical
models and computational simulations, but also across dif-
ferent formalisms or experimental setups within each broad
method, is a standard way to explore robust properties. This
corresponds to both structural and representational robustness
noted above. The same core structures are found across these
models, but other variables can differ (e.g. learning algo-
rithm, size of population). That these additional variations do
not affect the core finding (emergence of linguistic structure)
provides support for the claim that the core structures really
are the essential causal components in these models. Further,
that these models can be constructed in a range of compu-
tational and mathematical frameworks, and still give rise to
emergence linguistic structure, means that these results are
not related to specific features of these frameworks - they are
representationally robust. Both provide support for the claim
that linguistic structure is a robust property of ILM models.
However, this method of constructing and comparing a
range of computational and mathematical models is not
widely found in current practice in cognitive science, where
researchers are often wedded to particular frameworks. The
field of language evolution may require this kind of approach
because its precise object of study is still being identified, so
the key variables and relations to consider are not yet obvious.
For example, it is difficult to intuit about the abstract proper-
ties of a culturally transmitted linguistic system underpinned
by genetic constraints (Christiansen & Kirby, 2003).
Human simulations
Another crucial way of exploring the relations between sim-
ulations and real systems, used in language evolution, is to
replace computer agents in agent-based models with human
subjects (Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008). The inclusion of
this much wider range of structural features (such as real bio-
logical learning mechanisms) provides a strong test for claims
about the core structural features and representational robust-
ness of ILM models. However, that subjects already know
natural languages is seen as a strong confounding factor in
the interpretation of human simulations. There are two stan-
dard responses to this.
Firstly, there are the experimental controls. Compositional
structure does not always emerge in these simulations, only
when both the pressures of expressivity and learnability are
applied. Also, the human participants, far from deliberately
introducing familiar linguistic structures, rarely expressed an
understanding of the principles behind the experiment, most
even not noticing that they were being tested on meanings that
they had not been taught (Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008).
Secondly, there is an argument based on the notion of ro-
bustness. Human simulations can be seen as further explo-
rations of structural and representational robustness, that in-
clude both actual biological mechanisms (e.g. learning), but
also potentially problematic factors (subjects already know
natural languages). That linguistic structure still reliably
emerges from iterated learning paradigms under pressures for
learnability and expressivity, even when significant variables
are changed, provides more evidence that the emergence of
linguistic structure is a robust property of these models.
Summary: Learning from simulations in the ILM
Since there is little empirical evidence about the facts of lan-
guage evolution, the strength of model-target ‘fit’ may not be
most convincingly based on the comparison to the real world,
but on the robust properties found under various simplicifi-
cations and idealisations of real world target systems. Even
if we are not sure of how precisely to represent a target sys-
tem, the fact that many highly idealised representations of
the same system make a similar prediction (e.g. emergence
of compositionality), can be sufficient to suggest that this is
what is happening in the target system itself. In this case, the-
oretical claims based on robust properties already have some
degree of ‘fit’ with target systems, purely because of the na-
ture of robustness.
Robustness in Cognitive Science
The sections above illustrate how to productively use robust-
ness notions in cognitive science. Modelling the same pro-
cess over different formalisms or frameworks, and over com-
putational, mathematical and human models and simulations,
can help identify general principles and core variables and
constraints. Each particular model need not have high model-
world fit, but together the emergence of a robust property cuts
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through these problems. However, there are of course limits
to robustness approaches, and, as with any other methodol-
ogy, there are no clear cut rules about its application.
First, it is not clear, in general, how many independent
lines of evidence (i.e. different models/simulations) one must
have in order to identify a ‘real’ robust property, and the core
causal structure that gives rise to it. Yet this may become
more clear in specific contexts. In some cases two or three
very different models/simulations (e.g. containing very dif-
ferent assumptions) might be sufficient to warrant an infer-
ence to the existence of a robust property. Alternatively, a
larger group of similar models/simulations that together sur-
vey a wide range of alternative assumptions may be required.
The identification of surprising convergence across different
models will always be context dependent.
Second, robustness analyses can be misleading. One might
identify a robust property, and the causal structure that gives
rise to it, on the basis of different models that all incorpo-
rate the same erroneous assumptions. An inference that this
causal structure is also found in the world, and explains some
cognitive phenomenon, would therefore be unwarranted. One
might also make mistakes in identifying the robust property
(perhaps it is more or less specific than found in the models),
and what the relevant causal structure is.
Clearly, robustness approaches are defeasible, just as any
other methods are. Yet the promotion of the use of a wide
range of different frameworks found in robustness-based ap-
proaches may minimise the kind of errors identified above,
or identify them earlier than approaches that stay within one
modelling framework. Further, models will still be held ac-
countable to the usual range of relevant empirical and theo-
retical work. Therefore robustness analyses should be seen
as a additional methodological tool that can help to test and
strengthen theoretical claims that are largely made on the ba-
sis of models and simulations.
Finally, one might question whether robustness analyses
can not only support theoretical claims (as illustrated above),
but also show when they are unfounded. In fact, it seems that
criticisms of overfitting, highly parameterised models (e.g.
Pitt & Myung, 2002), often based on model comparisons that
include controls for model complexity (e.g. Hansen & Yu,
2001), do just this. Low-parameter models with a stable core
of causal components tend to be favoured in cognitive sci-
ence, which is entirely consistent with a preference for high
levels of parameter and structural robustness.
One implication of the use of robustness analyses is that
traditional debates about the validity of different modelling
approaches may not be constructive. For example, re-
searchers have debated whether ‘bottom-up’ or ‘top-down’
approaches are the most productive for researching cogni-
tion (Griffiths, Chater, Kemp, Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 2010;
McClelland et al., 2010). With a robustness approach, the
question is not about which provides more realistic models or
which can provide clearer analytic results, but how they can
complement each other’s strengths and weaknesses. In this
case, it makes sense for researchers to use both approaches
to identify robust properties, and thus converge on mutually
supported theories.
Conclusion
This paper used research in language evolution to illustrate
a robustness approach to modelling in cognitive science. It
showed how robustness analyses support the identification of
linguistic structure as robust property of the processes of cul-
tural transmission, as modelled and simulated across a range
of mathematical models, computational simulation frame-
works and human experiments.
The robustness approach outlined here strongly contrasts
with typical practices in cognitive science, where the aim
is often to develop a single model, developed in a specific
modelling framework, to account for a narrow range of data.
Often, though not always, such practices generate models
that lack predictive power and generality, and parameter and
structural robustness. With the realisation that such models
may have little to do with actual cognitive processes, pres-
sures from new statistical methods of model comparisons are
starting to force alternative methods of model construction.
A robustness approach directly promotes the development
of models with high parameter, structural and representa-
tional robustness. These are often seen as positive features
of models, as the output of such models can be traced to the
activities of a set of core causal components, not to specific
parameter settings, or to artifactual features of the modelling
framework used. The use of multiple modelling/simulation
frameworks also makes it easier to identify artefacts and core
variables in models. Finally, robustness analyses offer a way
of providing support for theoretical claims when there is little
direct empirical evidence available. In this case, a robustness
approach stands as a powerful alternative approach to mod-
elling in cognitive science, and one we recommend highly.
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